The economic background [March 1995] by McDonald, Ronnie & Swales, Kim
Strathprints Institutional Repository
McDonald, Ronnie and Swales, Kim (1995) The economic background 
[March 1995]. Quarterly Economic Commentary, 20 (3). pp. 1-5. ISSN 
0306-7866 , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/52733/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Proposals for the Reform of the International 
Monetary System 
The recent slide in the external value of the US 
dollar, and the consequent volatility of exchange 
rates associated with this, has once again raised the 
appropriateness of the current, rather ad hoc, 
arrangements by which the key currencies of the 
world economy are linked together. As a result, 
proposals for the reform of the International 
Monetary System (IMS) are likely to become 
especially topical again. In this article, therefore, 
we take the current backdrop of currency volatility 
as a motivation for reexamining the case for the 
reform of the IMS and the current range of options 
available. 
Ever since the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods-Smithsonian system of fixed but 
adjustable exchange rates in 1973, the IMS has 
been characterised by some form of floating 
exchange rates. The degree of cleanness of the 
float has varied from period to period, with at times 
concerted and coordinated foreign exchange 
market intervention of central banks aimed at 
stabilising currencies. There is now a general 
consensus amongst international economists, 
regardless of their monetarist or Keynesian 
predilections, tiiat the current version of the IMS 
has been one in which exchange rates have been 
excessively volatile. This excessitivity may be 
gauged in a variety of ways. For example, 
exchange rates have been excessively volatile 
relative to the fundamental determinants of 
exchange rates, such as the prices of goods and 
services, and also to the expected exchange rate 
change contained in forward exchange rates.1 
The volatility of currencies is seen as having 
important implications for the informational 
efficiency with which financial markets operate and 
1For a fuller discussion of these points, and 
of other points made in this article, see 
MacDonald, R. "International Financial Stability", 
in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and 
Finance, (eds) J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P 
Newman, (1992), London: Macmillan. 
also, more generally, to the extent that exchange 
rates may remain over or undervalued for long 
periods of time, for the efficiency with which 
goods, services and capital are allocated in the 
world economy. 
Although a large amount of empirical work has 
indeed verified that financial markets, and 
particularly the foreign exchange market, are 
informationally inefficient, empirical work on the 
effects of exchange rate volatility on trade and 
investment is less clear-cut; the body of academic 
work which has quantified an effect of exchange 
rate volatility on trade and investment, suggests 
that exchange rate volatility has only a very 
limited effect on these kinds of variables. 
The main reason for the failure to find a significant 
relationship between exchange rate volatility and 
trade and investment is often attributed to the 
existence of financial derivative markets, such as 
forward and futures markets, with which 
international investors and traders can hedge 
their positions and effectively shift the exchange 
rate volatility onto others better able to internalise 
it (such as banks). This kind of argument is 
correct as far as it goes, but it misses two key 
points. First, such hedging is bought at a price, 
namely the foreign exchange risk premium, and 
this price is likely to be especially large when 
exchange rates are very volatile. The existence of 
this risk premium may of itself be a sufficient 
disincentive for traders not to consider entering 
international markets, or, if they do, taking very 
limited positions. This effect will be reinforced by 
the fact that markets for hedging risk are 
incomplete; they may be very good for periods of 
up to three months or even a year, but beyond 
that the ability to hedge is effectively 
non-existent. Hence an investor, say, considering 
undertaking new capital investment, the output from 
which would be geared to foreign markets for a 
number of years may consider the whole venture 
too risky in the presence of incomplete markets. 
The other key empirical characteristic of exchange 
rate behaviour during the recent float has been that 
exchange rates have often been misaligned rates. 
That is .to say, exchange rates have often taken long 
swings away from their values based on 
fundamentals, such as relative prices and money 
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supplies, and the consequent changes in 
competitiveness has had dramatic implications for 
competitiveness, trade flows and deviations of 
output and employment from their full employment 
levels. Perhaps one of the most dramatic examples 
of this was the large appreciation of the pound 
sterling in the period 1979-1981. On most 
estimates this misalignment resulted in 20 per cent 
of the UK industrial base being destroyed, with the 
consequences this had for trade flows, output and 
unemployment. The long swings of the US dollar 
in the 1980s (the dramatic appreciation in the first 
half of the 80's and the equally dramatic 
depreciation in the latter half) are another 
example of misalignment. A current example of 
misalignment is the value of the US dollar, 
which, most commentators would agree, is far 
from its purchasing power parity value. 
The ability of an IMS, characterised by a system 
of floating exchange rates, to produce excessive 
exchange volatility and persistent misalignments 
has led many economists to advocate an 
alternative system of monetary arrangements. We 
now turn to a discussion of the more popular 
proposals. 
Reform Proposals for the International 
Monetary System 
One reform proposal for the EMS, and perhaps the 
most extreme, entails a return to the Classical 
gold standard system, which prevailed for the 
period 1870 to 1914. In this system, each 
participating country was committed to backing 
its paper money with gold at a fixed price per 
ounce and this, in turn, meant that each 
country's currency was pegged to the other 
participants at a fixed rate. A country was supposed 
to play by the 'rules of the game' and therefore a 
balance of payments deficit would result in a gold 
outflow, a decrease in the domestic money supply 
which would ultimately provide a self-correction to 
the balance of payments disequilibria. Further, the 
ability to ship gold at a fixed price put a very 
real discipline on inflation rates getting too far out 
of line between countries. 
Although there is much debate in the academic 
literature about whether countries participating in 
the gold standard actually played by the rules of the 
game, research by the author suggests that despite 
this the system was nevertheless highly credible 
(indeed even the inter-war experience of the gold 
standard turns out to be a highly credible system). 
One of the main problems in reintroducing this 
kind of system at the present time is that there 
are currently very large stocks of gold held by 
various institutions and this, in addition to the 
rather capricious nature of the supply of gold, 
would probably make it impossible to implement 
a credible gold standard system. More generally, 
one can probably do no better than quoting 
Anna Schwartz, an acknowledged expert on the 
operation of the gold standard, who concluded after 
her exhaustive review of the operation of the 
standard that: "The objective factors that served 
to promote the international gold-standard in the 
past are no longer favourable to such an institution" 
One alternative to returning to a formal gold 
standard is the 'gold standard without gold' proposal 
of Ronald McKinnon. Essentially this involves 
the three key currency blocks, represented by the 
mark, yen and US dollar locking their currencies 
together with rigidly fixed exchange rates; it is 
suggested that they should be locked together 
using the concept of purchasing power parity the 
idea that relative (wholesale or producer prices) 
determines the equilibrium exchange rate. A world 
monetary aggregate is then constructed 
(representing the weighted sum of the key 
industrialised countries money supplies) and this 
aggregate is targeted by the central banks of the 
three countries whose currencies are firmly locked, 
in order to achieve world price stability. 
To McKinnon the key advantage of the lock in 
exchange rates is that it would do away with the 
unpleasant consequences of exchange rate 
volatility. However, in rigidly locking currencies 
together the benefits of exchange rate flexibility 
are being abandoned and tfiese benefits are likely 
to be important for the three currencies which are 
the focus of the McKinnon plan. For example, we 
know that in the post war period there have been 
substantial productivity swings between Japan and 
the US and such swings, in the absence of 
downward flexibility of domestic prices, have 
required nominal exchange rate adjustment. 
Locking the nominal rates, in the presence of 
such productivity swings would put potentially 
unsustainable pressure on unemployment and, 
ultimately, the credibility of the exchange rate fix. 
It would seem perhaps that such a system would 
only be credible if it became the 'gold standard 
with gold' but even then, of course, there would still 
be the problem of reconciling the 
unemployment differences that would inevitably 
emerge across countries. Further, it seems 
unlikely, from a political economy perspective, 
that Germany would be prepared to subsume its 
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monetary policy for the greater good of the 
operation of the world economy. 
As we have said one issue concerning the 
McKinnon plan is that by locking currencies 
together it throws away any potential benefits of 
exchange rate flexibility. An alternative plan, 
known as the Williamson-Miller (WM) plan, tries 
to achieve the best of both worlds in the sense that 
it offers a plan to rid the key currencies of 
volatility, while at the same time maintaining 
some flexibility between currencies. The WM 
plan is Keynesian, or neo-Keynesian, in 
orientation and involves a complete set of 
policy coordination rules to be followed by the 
main G-7 currencies. 
In particular, each country participating in the WM 
plan would have the objectives of maintaining 
internal (full employment with low inflation) and 
external balance (a 'sustainable' current account 
balance) in the medium run. It is envisaged that 
each country's fiscal policy is used to maintain 
internal balance whilst monetary policy, in the 
form of interest rate adjustment, is used to ensure 
the effective exchange rate moves to achieve 
external balance. 
All of the above proposals for reform are 
interesting and have their separate merits. We 
believe that the central idea of these reform 
proposals, that exchange rate volatility should be 
attenuated, is correct and therefore the key 
currencies should be linked in such a way that this 
is achieved. In contrast to the above proposals, we 
would propose a return to a version of the 
Bretton Woods system that proved so successful 
in promoting international trade and investment in 
the post war period. In contrast to the historical 
Bretton Woods system, though, the specification 
and use of an effective adjustment mechanism 
would have to be a central feature of any new 
version of the Bretton Woods system. 
THE UK ECONOMY 
Macroeconomic Trends 
In the fourth quarter of 1994, the provisional 
estimate of GDP at market prices - 'money' GDP 
- rose by 1.4%. After allowing for inflation and 
adjusting for factor costs, GDP grew by 0.8% 
during the quarter, compared with the 0.8% increase 
recorded in the third quarter of 1994. Over the year 
to the fourth quarter, 'real' GDP is estimated to 
have risen by 3.9%. When oil and gas extraction 
are excluded 'real' GDP is estimated to have risen 
by 0.7% in the fourth quarter and by 3.6% over the 
same period a year ago. 
Output of the production industries in the three 
months to December 1994 is provisionally 
estimated to have risen by 0.5% over the previous 
three months, with output rising by 5% compared 
with the same period a year ago. Within production, 
manufacturing experienced an increase in output 
of 0.7% on the previous three months, output of the 
other energy and water supply industries fell by 3%, 
and production of oil and gas rose by 2.4%. 
Manufacturing output in the fourth quarter was 
5.2% above the same period a year ago. The output 
of the service sector is provisionally estimated to 
have risen by 0.9% in the fourth quarter and by 
3.6% over the fourth quarter 1993. 
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The CSO's coincident cyclical indicator for 
December 1994, which attempts to show current 
turning points around the long-term trend, continued 
to rise, although at a reduced rate. The index has 
been steadily rising since May 1992, suggesting an 
upturn in the spring of that year. The shorter 
leading index, which attempts to indicate turning 
points about six months in advance, fell in 
December 1994 as well as January this year and has 
been falling since September 1994. The longer 
leading index, which purports to indicate turning 
points about one year in advance, fell in the middle 
of last year, was relatively flat until April of this 
year, rose again in May and June but has fallen 
ever since including the latest data point in January. 
In the fourth quarter of 1994, real consumers' 
expenditure rose by 0.6% after rising by 0.5% in 
both the third and second quarters. Spending during 
the fourth quarter 1994 rose by 2% on the same 
period a year earlier. 
The provisional official retail sales volume figures 
seasonally adjusted for December 1994, were 0.5% 
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above the September figure. Over the year to 
December, the volume of sales rose by 3.8%. 
Taking the three months to December, the volume 
of retail sales rose by 0.5% and by 3.2% over the 
same period a year earlier. So, after a slight fall in 
the volume of retail sales in August, sales picked up 
in September, remained flat until November and 
then rose slightly in December. However, the latest 
CBI distributive trades survey for February 
suggests that retail demand is continuing to decline. 
A balance of 11% of retailers in the survey reported 
that sales were lower last month than in February 
1994; this is to be compared with the balance of 
2% in January reporting lower sales, and which was 
itself the weakest return since August 1992. 
The underlying determinants of consumers' 
spending appear to have strengthened slightly in the 
middle of the year. The consumer credit figures for 
December show that net lending to consumers by 
finance houses and other credit grantors (excluding 
bank loans) rose to £583m in December from 
£504m in November. However, these figures 
represent a falling back from 1994's monthly peak 
of £632m in August, although the November and 
December figures were somewhat higher than the 
£479m and £45 lm recorded in September and 
October respectively. Net lending to consumers in 
the fourth quarter of 1994 rose to £l,588m 
compared with £ 1,460m in the third quarter. The 
saving ratio fell in the second quarter 1994 from 
11% in the fourth quarter 1993 to 9.3%. The 
underlying increase in average weekly earnings in 
the year to December 1994 is provisionally 
estimated to have been 3.75%, unchanged from 
November and since June. Real personal 
disposable income is estimated to have fallen by 
1.8% in the second quarter 1994 to a level 1.2% 
lower than in the same period in 1993. 
General government final consumption rose by 
0.4% in the fourth quarter 1994. Government 
consumption in the fourth quarter was 1.4% higher 
than in the corresponding quarter of 1993. 
Real gross fixed investment or Gross domestic 
fixed capital formation rose by 1.4% in the fourth 
quarter to a level 1.4% higher than in the fourth 
quarter 1993. The provisional estimate of capital 
expenditure by manufacturing industry in the fourth 
quarter was 3% higher than in the third quarter and 
5% higher than in the fourth quarter of 1993. For 
1994 as a whole capital expenditure in 
manufacturing was 1% higher than in 1993. By 
particular categories of expenditure, there was an 
increase of 10% for new building work, little 
change for plant and machinery and a decrease of 
8% for vehicles in 1994 over 1993. 
Turning to the balance of payments, the current 
account for the third quarter 1994 was, after 
seasonal adjustment, in surplus to the tune of 
£0.8bn, compared to revised estimates of deficits of 
£l.lbn, and £1.5bn in the second and first quarters, 
respectively. The surplus on invisible trade stood 
at £2.4bn, an increase over the £1.3bn recorded in 
the second quarter and the £1.5bn surplus in the 
first quarter. On visible trade, the third quarter 
deficit stood at £1.5bn compared with £2.4bn in 
the second quarter and £3bn in the first quarter. The 
surplus on the oil account fell from £ 1276m in the 
second quarter to £1029m in the third quarter. 
UK LABOUR MARKET 
Employment and Unemployment 
UK unemployment fell by 41,400 in the quarter to 
January 1995, so that the overall UK unemployment 
rate now stands at 8.5%, with a male and female 
rate of 11.4% and 4.6% respectively. However, the 
reduction in unemployment has not been 
accompanied by a rise in unfilled vacancies. 
Rather, vacancies, after having increased for over a 
year, fell slightly in the quarter to January. In the 
last month there has been a radical adjustment to 
the employment estimates. It is now believed that 
the previous data underestimated the employment 
level in the last two years by around 100,000 jobs, 
the revisions mainly occuring in construction. 
However, even with these additions, only the most 
recent figures for total UK employment reflect the 
strengthening in the labour market suggested by the 
declining unemployment rate. The figure for total 
employment for the quarter to December 1994 is 
25,626,000, an increase of 115,000 (0.5%) in the 
quarter from September and an increase of 266,000 
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(1.0%) from June. This employment total is the 
highest for over two years. 
Earnings and Productivity 
Wage inflation continued at an annual rate of 3.75% 
to the end of 1994, but with the differential rates 
between manufacturing and service sectors 
increasing. In the quarter to December 1994 the 
underlying year-on-year increase in wages in 
services was 3%, whilst the same figure for 
manufacturing was 5%. The rate of growth of 
labour productivity in the whole economy continues 
to be high at 4% for the third quarter of 1994 and 
is particularly high in manufacturing which 
registered an increase of 5.9% over the previous 
year. The result is that manufacturing experienced 
a fall in unit labour costs, compared to the previous 
year, of 1.5% in the third quarter and 0.6% in the 
fourth quarter of 1994. For the whole economy, the 
most up to date figures are for the third quarter 
where unit labour costs were unchanged from the 
previous year. 
UK OUTLOOK 
Growth in the UK economy still appears to be 
primarily driven by net export demand. GDP was 
growing at an annual rate of just below 4% at the 
end of last year and the CSO now estimate that 
growth for 1994 will stand at 3.8%. Since growth 
rates of 3.5% to 3% are some way above trend 
growth it must be presumed that such rates are 
unsustainable without an acceleration of inflation 
and a deteriorating balance of payments and/or 
exchange rate position. Growth should continue at 
around 3.5% this year falling to about 2.5% next 
year. 
Domestic demand still appears to be relatively 
weak, a perception which has been further 
reinforced by the latest CBI distributive trades 
survey (for February) which revealed that retail 
demand is continuing to fall with retailers taking 
the view that demand in the high-street is at its 
weakest since August 1992. Nevertheless, the CSO, 
in commenting on the latest GDP data, noted that 
while net trade accounted for most of the growth in 
the middle of 1994, increases in domestic demand 
accounted for all the growth between the third and 
fourth quarters. The CSO pointed to the upturn in 
investment which has been long awaited and which 
appears to have arrived in the final quarter of last 
year as investment increased by 1.4% after falling 
earlier in the year. Plant and machinery investment 
rose by 2.5% and investment in dwellings rose by 
5%. Such investment is clearly necessary if the 
economy is to reduce potential capacity constraints 
and sustain growth rates above the 2.25% long-term 
trend. Moreover, the data show that the growth of 
consumer spending rose slightly from 0.5% to 0.6% 
in the fourth quarter. However, the recent survey 
data cast doubt on whether such growth will be 
sustained. And a slow growth of consumer demand 
may still offer the best hope that the recovery will 
not too soon run into inflation and balance of 
payments problems. An upturn in domestic demand 
may prove necessary to sustain the recovery but it 
is much more preferable if the source of rising 
domestic demand is principally investment rather 
than consumption. 
The recent fall in sterling has given some cause for 
concern, since a falling exchange rate is, if left 
unchecked by an interest rate rise, a harbinger of a 
future rise in inflation. However, the fall in the 
trade-weighted index (over 2%) is much less than 
the fall against the DM and it is this index which is 
most relevant for domestic monetary policy 
decisions. The weakening of sterling appears to be 
a particular outcome of the general strength of the 
DM against all currencies, and would not appear to 
be sufficient justification in itself for a further rise 
in base rates. 
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